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ABSTRACT
Relational DBMSs continue to dominate the database market, and
inference problem on external schema of relational DBMS’s is still
an important issue in terms of data privacy. Especially for the
last 10 years, external schema construction for application-specific
database usage has increased its independency from the conceptual
schema, as the definitions and implementations of views and pro-
cedures have been optimized. This paper offers an optimized de-
composition strategy for the external schema, which concentrates
on the privacy policy and required associations of attributes for the
intended user roles. The method proposed in this article performs a
proactive decomposition of the external schema, in order to satisfy
both the forbidden and required associations of attributes. Func-
tional dependency constraints of a database schema can be repre-
sented as a graph, in which vertices are attribute sets and edges
are functional dependencies. In this representation, inference prob-
lem can be defined as a process of searching a subtree in the de-
pendency graph containing the attributes that need to be related.
The optimized decomposition process aims to generate an external
schema, which guarantees the prevention of the inference of the
forbidden attribute sets while guaranteeing the association of the
required attribute sets with a minimal loss of possible association
among other attributes, if the inhibited and required attribute sets
are consistent with each other. Our technique is purely proactive,
and can be viewed as a normalization process. Due to the usage in-
dependency of external schema construction tools, it can be easily
applied to any existing systems without rewriting data access layer
of applications. Our extensive experimental analysis shows the ef-
fectiveness of this optimized proactive strategy for a wide variety
of logical schema volumes.
1. INTRODUCTION
As the demand towards automated systems and processes have
increased, the technology in business applications has focused on
to two different dimensions: application usage and statistical analy-
sis. In each case, inference based privacy preserving techniques, in
terms of databases, has been an important problem in order to pro-
tect the sensitive data. Modern approaches like differential privacy
preserving techniques[12, 16] or intentionally deception mecha-
nisms provide secure ways to represent statistical results without
revealing sensitive data. However their usage cannot be applied to
traditional applications [23].
Many business applications aim to monitor and update single
entity data. As an example, consider a call center module of a
bank. When a customer wants to apply for a campaign, the opera-
tor should check her transaction history for prerequisites. Transac-
tions are sensitive data, but, they cannot be altered by adding noise
or hypothetical rows cannot be added for deception. The financial
transactions should be viewed exactly as they are. If the task were a
statistical analysis of transactions, then both techniques could have
been applied to protect the inference of sensitive data. However
these kinds of processes are mainly based on single entity business
procedures, as standard application usage. That is, the call center
employee should be able to access to a set of sensitive data accord-
ing to assigned user role, and, the external layer of the database
presented to this user role should not reveal any more information
other than required.
This objective needs three different perspectives. Firstly, the
schema of external layer should be decomposed with a fine-grained
attribute-based approach which preserves required associations for
the user role and prevents any other inferences. This objective is the
focus of this article, as necessary theorems and algorithms is pro-
posed in this paper. The second perspective deals with inferences
based on dynamic data distribution and the last one is about collab-
oration attacks [8, 13]. Both of them are also needed to be handled
in order to satisfy privacy of sensitive data. The mechanisms for the
last two inference channels can be applied as add-ons to the strat-
egy given in this paper. However, the main and the first objective
should be arranging the external layer for a specific user to prevent
all unwanted inference operations. By definition, this is a proactive
step, and it should be viewed as a policy-based normalization stage
in terms of privacy.
For this research, we have been motivated with a real life exam-
ple. The problem was related with the recycling business applica-
tion developed for a municipality in Antalya province in Turkey.
The product was a web and point-of-sale application, in which, all
citizens having smart cards were giving their recycling wastes to
the waste-collector companies, and these companies were loading
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credits to the cards of citizens according to the current expected
market value of the waste, also determined by type of the waste.
In 2016, a citizen complained that she has been identified, and she
is receiving messages in consistent with her consumption and re-
cycling waste she has produced. It may be argued that many cit-
izens may have nearly same consumption and thoroughly, waste
statistics distributed within a year. However, the case is different as
the claimant owns a hand-made gift company and has much more
glass waste in November during preparation of gifts for new years
day. Recycled waste collector companies were expected to query
the time-based collection statistics of the trucks and the town man-
agement was also expected only to view the usage statistics of the
system. Additionally, collectors views are defined only as a subset
of the town management external view set.
For a simplified description, the views are as follows:
[Available for the Collector and Town Management]
View1 = (TruckId, DateTime, GPSCoordinates,
TotalWasteWeight, RecyclingWasteWeight,
WasteType)
[Available for only Town Management]
View2 = (CitizenId, Name, Surname, Address,
PhoneNumber)
A malicious worker in the town management can use GPSCoor-
dinates attribute in association with the Address attribute and de-
termine a small subset of citizens who had given glass waste in a
period of time, using a simple GPS checking function near, such
as:
Select *
From View1, View2
Where near(GPSCoordinates, Address)
Indeed, one malicious worker has shared this information with
an advertisement company and they have used this information in
favor of their glass-producer clients. It is not surprising to receive
messages from other glass-producers for a company which always
purchases glass. However this small gift company is a part of a
charity organization and they use glasses they have collected from
their members, and they do not purchase too much from the market.
Therefore, it was not possible for glass-producers to determine this
company for advertisement. As a result, the privacy of the citizen
had been violated. The main reason behind the problem is the lack
of security policy while defining views and the attribute association
based cross-control in between views. As a solution, security de-
pendent sets have been formed for the original database schema and
the algorithms proposed in this paper have been applied. It should
be noted that the relationship between GPSCoordinates and Ad-
dress attributes is a probabilistic dependency, which can be treated
as a kind of functional dependency. To overcome this privacy prob-
lem, following views are generated:
New View1 = (TruckId, DateTime, WasteType,
RecyclingWasteWeight, TotalWasteWeight)
New View2 = (TruckId, GPSCoordinates)
New View3 = (CitizenId, Name, Surname,
Address, PhoneNumber)
Any join between New View1 and New View2 is not a meaning-
ful join 1 as TruckId is only foreign key, not a primary or candidate
key, in these relations [26].
This paper focuses on this problem and presents a complete mech-
anism to satisfy the goal. The core of the mechanism is based on the
Functional Dependency Graph representation of database schema,
which is constructed by defining attribute-sets as vertices and de-
pendencies as edges. The aim is to find an external layer decompo-
sition which strictly allows the required attribute associations and
prevents inhibited associations, both in compliance with the privacy
policy for a specific user role. Owing to the nature of domain, the
proposed mechanism has attribute based granularity and the advan-
tage of rearranging external layer without making any change on
other layers. There may be other alternative approaches also for
the kind of secure decomposition, introduced in this paper. The de-
composition may be based on the forbidden attribute sets to satisfy
the privacy or the required attributes sets needed for the user role
[5]. The strategy given in this paper is an optimized combination
of these two approaches and the most crucial step proposed in this
paper, is to check the required sets together with the forbidden sets.
This control step assures a fully compliant policy proactively.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the preliminaries
and problem definition are given in the next section. In the fol-
lowing section, we first present graph-based representation of the
problem and, then, formal definitions related to the problem and
the algorithm for secure decomposition, which is based only on in-
hibited attribute sets, is given, which aims to minimize dependency
loss. Afterward, the required attribute sets are defined, and the al-
gorithm is extended to perform a complete policy-check and output
a minimal secure decomposition, by the help of both user policy-
based requirements and privacy policy. All algorithms are proven
to produce secure decompositions. A brief related work section is
given for literature review and experiments are also performed to
show that the algorithm is also applicable even in large relational
schemas. Future work and conclusions are given at the end of the
paper.
2. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM DEF-
INITION
Secure decomposition of the external schema to prevent unwanted
inferences has been covered firstly in literature by [11] and [10].
These works concantrate on the required attribute sets (visibility
constraints) and produce minimal sized fragments according to the
dependencies and constraints. We have improved this process in
our previous work [26] and we have defined, security dependency
set concept and secure decomposition problem formally and we
have proposed a decomposition algorithm. The algorithm aims to
have maximal fragments (minimal dependency loss) according to
forbidden set of attributes.
We use the following concepts (the original and fully formal def-
initions are in [26]) as:
• Security dependent set is the set of attributes from the logi-
cal schema, which should not be associated by using related
schema and meaningful joins. The sets are determined logi-
cally with respect to the domain requirements.
• Meaningful join is briefly an equi-join operation in between
a foreign and primary keys. The inference problem is de-
fined on inhibiting all possible meaningful joins, among the
attributes of forbidden attribute sets.
1Equi-join between primary and foreign keys
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Figure 1: Dependency Graph
• R+ is given as the closure of all relations in a logical schema
where the closure is determined by performing all possible
meaningful joins to all relations of the schema.
• F+ is the closure of all functional dependencies including
the produced ones with transition, union and decomposition
properties of functional dependencies.
• Identifiers of an attribute are defined as the attribute set, to
which the attribute is dependent to in F+.
• Secure logical schema is the one which prevents all associ-
ations of the security dependent sets by using R+ and F+.
It is generated by a decomposition algorithm applied on the
original schema. The algorithm is given in [26].
The original definitions in [26] also includes the definition of
probabilistic dependencies. For the sake of simplicity, they can be
assumed to produce new security dependent sets as given in de-
composition algorithm. Therefore, probabilistic dependencies are
assumed to be inherently covered in all definitions and algorithms
in this paper. Moreover, security dependent sets with a single at-
tribute can easily be eliminated via removing this attribute from the
schema, so security dependent sets are all assumed to be consisted
of at least two attributes thereafter.
The decomposition algorithm, proposed in [26], works as fol-
lows:
1. Produce power set of all attributes for a relation.
2. For each element set in this power set:
(a) Eliminate the element set, if it contains all attributes of
any secure dependent set.
(b) Eliminate the element set, if it contains any attribute in
secure dependent set with its identifier.
3. Lastly, eliminate all element sets (trivial subsets), contained
by other element sets.
In order to illustrate the behavior of secure decomposition algo-
rithm in [26]. We consider the following simple example:
Let the relation Rk = {A,B,C,D} and A is the primary key,
single identifier for all other attributes, as the dependencies are il-
lustrated in Figure 1. Additionally, there is a single security depen-
dent set as {B,C}.
Therefore, the subsets containing bothB andC needs to be elim-
inated in order to prevent the association between B and C. More-
over, the subsets containing {A,B} and {A,C} will be eliminated
AD BD CD
B CA D
Figure 2: Dependency Graph After Strong-Cut
ACD BD
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Figure 3: Dependency Graph After Weak-Cut
as well, since A is the identifier. After the elimination of trivial
subsets, secure deposition of Rk can be given as:
Rk1 = {A,D} Rk2 = {B,D} Rk3 = {C,D}
As it can be seen from the new decomposed schema, there is no
way to perform a meaningful join between decomposed sets to as-
sociate B and C. As a graph notation (details will be discussed
later) Figure 2 shows the dependecnies formed after the decompo-
sition and according to this figure, there is no way to associate B
and C together, starting from a vertex in this graph. In other words,
if the ways of associate secure dependent sets attributes are defined
as a chain of functional dependencies through meaningful joins, the
algorithm breaks these chains from both sides for both attributes. It
is obvious that the relations containing the security dependent set
should be removed, but the algorithm in [26], breaks association of
each attribute in security dependent set with its identifiers to pre-
vent all meaningful joins. In this paper, we call this strategy as a
strong − cut approach.
However, this strong − cut approach can be relaxed by cutting
the chains only at a single point by producing:
Rk1 = {A,C,D} Rk2 = {B,D}
The dependencies of this schema is depicted in Figure 3. There
is also another possible schema as:
Rk1 = {A,B,D} Rk2 = {C,D}
Both of these schemas are consistent with the privacy constraint
defined by security dependency set. The aim of this work is to
develop a relaxed − cut algorithm that decomposes the original
schema with a minimum loss of functional dependencies while sat-
isfying the security constraints.
The motivation of this work can be described as developing a
decomposition that should not be much lossier than needed. This
requirement defines an optimization problem and to the best of our
knowledge, this is the first attempt in literature to construct an opti-
mized secure decomposition satisfying the policy, while minimiz-
ing the dependency loss.
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Directed graph representation is selected as the most suitable
mathematical model to represent the problem, since a functional
dependency can be easily demonstrated as a directed edge and by
this way, all algorithmic background in the graph theory can be
used for further enhancements of the concept and algorithm. As a
result, a new algorithm will be proposed for secure decomposition
concept, which aims to decompose the original schema minimally
by preserving the idea of prohibiting decomposed relations to be
used in meaningful joins to associate the attributes in a security
dependent set.
The problem is basically building a decomposition of the origi-
nal schema, as any set of securely dependent attributes cannot be
associated by joins on keys.
This paper also introduces required attribte set definition and the
relaxed-cut algorithm is improved with a consistency check among
forbidden and required set attributes.
3. RELAXED-CUT SECURE DECOMPOSI-
TION ALGORITHM
We firstly give the basic definitions by using graph notation.
DEFINITION 1. Functional Dependency Graph (denoted as FDG
hereafter, for a schema) The given functional dependency set (F) of
a logical schema (where F is decomposed - i.e., there is a single el-
ement on the right hand side - and thus for each functional depen-
dency Fi such as Ai → Aj , Ai is an attribute set and Aj is a single
attribute) can be represented as a directed graph G = (V,E) as
follows:
• In a normalized schema, all attributes are expected to exist in
Aj , but the schema may not be normalized, so each attribute
should also be element of V individually.
• Each one of Ai and Aj is a single node in V
• Each relation (attribute sets) is an individual node in V .
• Each dependencies of F+i is an edge in E, if both sides of
the dependency exist as a different node in V .
Example-1: Assume that the logical schema S consists of four
relations R1, R2, R3 and R4:
R1 = {A,B,C,D}
FR1 = {A→ B,A→ C,A→ D,
D → A,D → B,D → C}
R2 = {E,F,G,H}
FR2 = {E → F,E → G,E → H,
H → E,H → F,H → G}
R3 = {A,E} where A and E are foreign keys.
R4 = {H,D} where H andD are foreign keys.
Then, the graph (FDG) constructed for this schema is given in
Figure 4.
EFGH
F
G
E
H
ABCD
B
C
A
D
AE HD
Figure 4: FDG of Example-1
Algorithm 1 Constructing Functional Dependency Graph (FDG)
Require:
S: logical schema as (R,F ),
Ensure:
FGDS = (V,E): functional dependency graph of S
1: begin
2: V ← {}
3: E ← {}
4: //Step-1
5: for each Fi(Xi → Yi) ∈ F do
6: if |Yi| > 1 then
7: remove Fi from F
8: for each Yj ∈ Yi do
9: add Xi → Yj to F
10: end for
11: end if
12: end for
13: //Step-2
14: for each Ri ∈ R do
15: for each Aj ∈ Ri do
16: add Aj to V
17: end for
18: end for
19: //Step-3
20: for each Fi(Xi → Yi) ∈ F do
21: if |Xi| > 1 and Xi /∈ V then
22: add Xi to V
23: end if
24: end for
25: //Step-4
26: for each Ri ∈ R do
27: if Ri /∈ V then
28: add Ri to V
29: end if
30: end for
31: //Step-5
32: F+ ← Closure set of F
33: //Step-6
34: for each Fi(Xi → Yi) ∈ F
+ do
35: if Xi 6= Yi andXi ∈ V and Yi ∈ V then
36: add Xi → Yi to E
37: end if
38: end for
39: end
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The steps of the FDG construction algorithm is as follows:
1. Decompose all functional dependencies in F , such that each
functional dependency will have a single element in the right-
hand side.
2. Create an individual vertex for all attributes in schema and
add to V .
3. Create vertices for the attribute sets with more than one ele-
ment, which exist in left-hand side of any functional depen-
dency and does not exist in V .
4. Create additional vertices, which include the attributes of a
relation in R and does not exist in V .
5. Generate F+
6. For each X → Y in F+, add an edge to E if X and Y are
different vertices in V .
The graph in Figure 4 is obtained by the above algorithm for
example-1.
LEMMA 1. The edges of transitive closure of FDG is equal to
F+
PROOF. (SKETCH) It can be easily seen that the transitive def-
inition is same for functional dependencies and its corresponding
graph. The equivalency is based on the transitive property on the
graphs and functional dependencies.
DEFINITION 2. Common Ancestor of an Attribute Set is a ver-
tex in FDG, from which there exist simple paths to each element
of attribute set.
In Figure 4, AE is one of the Common Ancestors for the set of
vertices {F,B}.
DEFINITION 3. Join Chain of an Attribute Set (Denoted as JC
hereafter) is the set of edges of simple paths in FDG, from a com-
mon ancestor to the attribute set.
The attribute sets may be a forbidden set (i.e. Secure Dependent
Set) or a required set (which will be defined later). Let the relational
schema is as given in Figure 4. Let the forbidden set is {F,B}, and
the functional dependency graph is constructed as in Figure 4. The
join chain sets according to the forbidden set is given as below.
The first join chain is emphasized with red colour and bold for an
ilustrative example.
JC1 = {AE → E,E → F,AE → A,A→ B}
JC2 = {HD → H,H → F,HD → D,D → B}
JC3 = {AE → E,E → H,H → F,
AE → A,A→ D,D → B}
JC4 = {AE → E,E → H,H → F,AE → A,A→ B}
JC5 = {AE → E,E → F,AE → A,A→ D,D → B}
JC6 = {HD → H,H → E,E → F,
HD → D,D → A,A→ B}
JC7 = {HD → H,H → F,HD → D,D → A,A→ B}
JC8 = {HD → H,H → E,E → F,HD → D,D → B}
Algorithm 2 Generating Join Chain Set Algorithm
Require:
FDG: functional dependency graph(V, E) of schema
A: attribute set
Ensure:
JC: join chain set
1: //Step-1
2: begin
3: JC ← {}
4: for each (Xi → Yi) ∈ E do
5: remove Xi → Yi from E
6: add Yi → Xi to E
7: end for
8: //Step-2
9: Initialize TargetArr as array of array of vertices
10: Initialize PathArr as array of array of set of edges
11: for each Ai ∈ A do
12: CAi ← empty set of connected vertices
13: PAi ← empty set of path edge sets
14: CAi , PAi ← applyDFS to FDG with starting vertex Ai
15: j ← 0
16: for each Cj in CAi do
17: TargetArr[i][j]← Cj
18: PathArr[i][j]← simple path to Cj in PAi
19: j ← j + 1
20: end for
21: end for
22: //Step-3
23: SharedArr ← array of shared vertices by all TargetArr rows
24: for each Si ∈ SharedArr do
25: add
⋃
(PathArr[k][l] as TargetArr[k][l] = Si) to JC
26: end for
27: //Step-4
28: for each JCi ∈ JC do
29: for each JCj ∈ JC do
30: if JCi ⊇ JCj then
31: remove JCi from JC
32: end if
33: end for
34: end for
35: end
The steps of the Join Chain Construction algorithm is as follows:
1. All edges are reversed.
2. Taking each element of attribute set (A) as starting vertex,
applyDFS up to all connected vertices and all possible sim-
ple paths are determined for each end vertex.
3. If there exist simple paths to the same end vertex, which are
common (common ancestors in original FDG) for all set at-
tributes (assumed to be starting vertices), all combinations of
constructed simple paths, starting from different set attribute
and ending in the same vertex is a join chain.
4. If a chain composes another chain, it is discarded.
In example-1,HD andAE are determined as common ancestors
and all combinations of simple paths as AE → B (2 alternatives)
& AE → F (2 alternatives) and HD → B (2 alternatives) and
HD → F (2 alternatives) are given as different join chains.
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DEFINITION 4. Minimum-Cut Secure Decomposition: Decom-
posing the relational schema by removing the minimum number of
functional dependencies (i.e., not allowing the attributes of the lost
functional dependency Ai → Aj in the same relation) to satisfy all
security requirements.
Minimized-Cut Secure Decomposition Problem is equivalent to
Minimum Hitting Set Problem [2] and thus it is NP-Complete. We
propose a simple greedy heuristic algorithm to solve Relaxed-Cut
Secure Decomposition problem (which is defined below), and due
to the structure of our problem, we observed that this greedy ap-
proach mostly determines the optimal solution.
DEFINITION 5. Relaxed-Cut Secure Decomposition: Decom-
posing the relational schema by greedly removing the functional
dependencies in ordet to cut the dependencies of secure dependent
attributes at least through one of the join chains.
Unlike strong cut which cuts the identifiers of all attributes of the
secure dependent sets, relaxed cut aims to remove the functional
dependencies as little as possible. The steps of the Relaxed-Cut
Secure Decomposition algorithm are as follows:
1. Calculate all join chains( JCi ) for each security dependent
set (Algorithm-2).
2. For each edge in the FDG, determine the number of times
(SecurityCount) it appears in join chains.
3. Sort the edges first according to their SecurityCount in de-
scending order, then, the number of attributes on the nodes
at both sides of the edge, in ascending order (in order to cut
lower chains first).
4. Traverse the sorted list and mark each join chain as cut, if the
edge is contained. These edges are selected ones and to be
a selected one, an edge should be an element of at least one
unmarked join chain. Set of selected edges are named as new
security dependent sets.
5. All subsets of the attributes of the relational schema are gen-
erated, which is called as PSRx in the algorithm. Then, for
each new security dependency set, each element of PSRx
is processed. The element set is eliminated if it contains all
attributes of that security dependency set together.
6. After that, among the remaining subsets redundant ones (used
for unnecessary sub-relations composed by other sub-relations)
are also eliminated.
The steps 1 through 4 can be named as Relaxation Stage and
steps 5 and 6 as Decomposition Stage. Decomposition stage is a
subpart of the secure decomposition algorithm proposed in [26] ex-
cept the identifier elimination stage.
Algorithm 3 Relaxed-Cut Secure Decomposition Algorithm
Require:
LS: logical schema as (R,F )
SD: set of security dependent sets for LS
Ensure:
PSR: a subset of maximal subsets of R satisfying security
decomposition constraints
1: begin
2: JC ← empty array of join chain sets
3: //Step-1
4: for each SDi ∈ SD do
5: JCi ← join chain set for SDi (Algorithm-2)
6: add JCi to JC
7: end for
8: FDG(V,E)← FDG of LS (Algorithm-1)
9: SecurityCount ← array of integers initialized to 0, size |E|
10: //Step-2
11: for each Ei ∈ E do
12: for each JCk ∈ JC do
13: for each JCki ∈ JCk do
14: if Ei ∈ JCki then
15: SecurityCount[i] + +
16: end if
17: end for
18: end for
19: end for
20: //Step-3
21: E ← sort edges in descending order (uses SecurityCount)
22: Selection← empty set of edges
23: for each Ei ∈ E do //Step-4
24: for each JCk ∈ JC do
25: for each JCki ∈ JCk do
26: if Ei ∈ JCki and JCki is unmarked then
27: mark JCki
28: add E to Selection
29: end if
30: end for
31: end for
32: end for
33: SDnew ← empty set of attribute sets
34: for each (Xi → Yi) ∈ Selection do
35: add (Xi ∪ Yi) to SDnew
36: end for
37: for each Rx ∈ R do //Step-5
38: PSRx ← Power Set of Rx
39: for each Di ∈ SDnew do
40: for each Sj ∈ PSRx do
41: if Di ⊆ Sj then
42: remove Sj from PSRx
43: end if
44: end for
45: end for
46: for each SSi ∈ PSRx do //Step-6
47: for each Sj ∈ SSi do
48: if Sj ⊆ SSi then
49: remove Sj from PSRx
50: end if
51: end for
52: end for
53: end for
54: end
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Figure 5: FDG of Example-3
Example-2: Consider the following schema and the forbidden
sets.
R1 = {A,B,C,D}
R2 = {E,F,G}
R3 = {A,E,M}
R4 = {J,K,L}
R5 = {M,H,R, J}
Forbidden Sets = {A,D}, {D, F}, {K,H}
Functional dependency graph is constructed as in Figure 5.
Join chains are determine for this example as follows:
For {A,D}:
JC1 = {e8} JC2 = {e10, e12}
JC3 = {e4, e5} JC4 = {e6, e12, e4}
JC5 = {e5, e6, e9} JC6 = {e9, e12}
For {D, F}:
JC7 = {e1, e2, e8, e14} JC8 = {e1, e2, e10, e12, e14}
For {K,H}:
JC9 = {e23, e25, e29} JC10 = {e19, e22, e29}
JC11 = {e20, e22, e23, e29}
Finally, relaxed cut secure dependency algorithm is executed us-
ing Security Counts. The edges are shown up to all marked ones in
Table-1. Plus (+) sign in a row indicates that this edge is selected
and the join chain on the column is marked. Minus (-) sign is used
for already marked join chains and the edges without plus (+) sign
in the row is not selected.
As a result, the following edges are selected:
{B → D,A→ D, J → K,B → A,ABCD → A}
Output of Algorithm in [26] with the Security Dependent Set
{A,D}, {D, F}, {K,H} would be as (i.e. with strong-cut):
R11 = {A,C} R12 = {B,C} R13 = {C,D}
R21 = {E,G} R22 = {F,G}
R3 = {A,E,M}
R41 = {J, L} R42 = {K,L}
R51 = {M,R, J} R52 = {J, R,H}
On the other hand the output of Algorithm-3 with Security De-
pendent Sets {B,D}, {A,D}, {J,K}, {A,B,C,D}will be as fol-
lows:
R11 = {A,C} R12 = {B,C} R13 = {C,D}
R2 = {E, F,G}
R3 = {A,E,M}
R41 = {J, L} R42 = {K,L}
R5 = {M,H,R, J}
The algorithm can be improved by defining a total participation
count to all edges for all possible join chains of combination of
attributes but it will result in a high time-cost.
THEOREM 3.1. Algorithm-3 generates a secure logical schema.
PROOF. Assume that the resulting decomposed relations can be
joined by foreign keys to associate securely dependent attributes.
Then the functional dependency graph of new schema should con-
tain a join chain for the attributes of this security dependent set.
However, this cannot happen since each join chain has been cut
at least by an edge and the attributes of these cut edges are given
as new security dependent sets, which means their coexistence is
prevented.
Therefore, resulting decomposed relations form a secure logical
schema and the new forbidden sets, serve for the same privacy de-
gree with respect to secure decomposition in [26] by using original
forbidden sets.
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4. SECURE DECOMPOSITION WITH RE-
QUIRED ATTRIBUTE SETS
Considering the frontend applicational usage of relational databases,
all roles and permitted functionalities are predetermined on the re-
quirement analysis and design stages of the project. Thus, each
functionality may be represented as a set of database queries and
each query can be shown as an attribute set, which should be asso-
ciated to accomplish the task. However, these required sets should
be checked against the security dependent sets as a verification step.
If any inconsistency is determined, the design of queries or security
policy should be reviewed. In addition to these, the decomposition
alternatives (according to the edge selection strategy in Algorithm-
3) can be quantified and chosen according to the given association
sets, which results in a decomposition which satisfies both security
dependencies and needed functionalities.
First, we define required attribute set:
DEFINITION 6. Required Attribute Set (Denoted as RS here-
after) is a set of attributes in the relational schema, which should
be associated with a series of meaningful joins to satisfy a func-
tionality of the applicational usage.
It is important to note that, each functionality of a user role
should be mapped to a set of RS.
Required and forbidden sets must be consistent, and the decom-
postion algorithm must satisfy both requirements.
DEFINITION 7. Consistency Check Between Required Sets and
Forbidden Sets: Required and Forbidden Sets are consistent with
each other if there is a ”cut set” that contains at least one element
from each one of the join chains for each forbidden set (each for-
bidden set forms a set of join chains) and there is at least one set in
join chains corresponding to each required set (each required set
forms a set of join chains) that do not contain any element from the
cut set.
In the case of any inconsistency discovered, security policy and
association set needs should be revised by the designer.
Consistency check (CC) problem can be simplified as follows:
the edges are mapped to letters, and thus join chains become set of
letters. The consistency check problem can be defined as to deter-
mine a set of letters (cut set) such that at least one letter from each
set of the forbidden sets and none of the letters in at least one of the
sets of each required set must be in the cut set.
Consider the following CC problem instance:
Join ChainsFS =


{e, f, g}
{a, b, c, d}
{a, e, c, d}
{b, f, g}


Join ChainsRS =


{
{a, b, f, g}
{b, c, f}
}
{
{d, e}
{c, g}
}


Cut-Set = {a, g}
Preserved Required Words = {{d, e}, {b, c, f}}
The above CC instance is consistents since at least one element
of the cut set {a, g} is in each forbidden set, and one set for each set
of required sets (as {d, e} and {b, c, f}) do not contain any element
of the cut set.
On the other hand, the following CC instance is inconsistent
since no cut set satisfying the requirements exists.
Join ChainsFS =


{e, f, g}
{a, b, c, d}
{a, e, c, d}
{b, f, g}


Join ChainsRS =


{
{a, b, f, g}
{b, f}
}
{
{d, g}
{c, g}
}


Found = Inconsistency
THEOREM 4.1. Consistency Check (CC) Problem is NP-Complete.
PROOF. Input: Set of setsA and set of sets of setsB as follows:
A = {{a11 , a12 , ...} , {a21 , ...} , ...}
B =
{{{
b111 , b112 , ...
}
,
{
b121 , ...
}
, ...
}
,
{{
b211 , ...
}
, ...
}
, ...
}
Problem: Given A and B as above determine (i.e. it is consis-
tent), if there is a set of aij for each i in A, there is at least one r
for each k in B such that bkr does not include any of aij .
More formally;
Given (A,B) sets, the system is consistent
if there exists C = {aij |∀i∃j(aij ∈ A)}
such that ∀k∃r(bkr ∈ B ∧ bkr ∩ C = ∅)
NPC Proof: Given 3SAT instance constuct an instance of CC as
follows:
3SAT instance: INS3SAT = (p11 ∨ p12 ∨ p13) ∧ (p21 ∨ p22 ∨
p23)∧ ...(ps1 ..) such that each pij is either qk or ¬qk and there are
exactly k different propositional variables q1,...qk
Construct instance INSCC as follows:
Generate A = {{q1,¬q1} , ..., {qk,¬qk}}
Generate B = {{{p11} , {p12} , {p13}} , ...}
INS3SAT is satisfiable if and only if INSCC is consistent.
INS3SAT is satisfiable if there is a truth assignment for each lit-
eral to make all clauses as true. This is equivalent to INSCC , such
that for each literal one element from each {qi,¬qi} is selected to
be in set C (that is equivalent to false in INS3SAT or an edge to
be cut in original consistency check problem). If each clause in
satisfiable in INS3SAT , then, at least 1 literal of pi1 or pi2 or pi3
must be true. That means either {pi1} ∩ C = ∅ or {pi2} ∩ C = ∅
or {pi3} ∩ C = ∅.
The following algorithm checks for inconsistency for given re-
quired setsRS and forbidden sets SD. The initial iterations are the
same to find a suitable decomposition, if exists.
The steps of the Algorithm-4 is as follows:
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1. Calculate all join chains(JCx) for each security dependent
set SD (Algorithm-2).
2. Calculate all join chains(JCy ) for each required attribute set
RS (Algorithm-2).
3. For each different edge combination set, in which each single
edge is chosen from a single join chain in all JCys, check if
these selected edges are unbroken while breaking all forbid-
den sets’s join chains, then there is a disjoint edge set which
breaks all join chains in JCx. If such an edge combination
cannot be found then inconsistency exists.
The process will continue with decomposition stage of Algorithm-
3 with CutSet output to find a secure decomposition.
Algorithm 4 Consistency Check and Determining Cut Set Algo-
rithm
Require:
RS: set of required sets for logical schema
SD: set of security dependent sets for logical schema
Ensure:
Inconsistent: true or false
CutSet: possible forbidden sets for decomposition
1: begin
2: JCx ← set of join chain sets
3: JCy ← array of set of join chain sets
4: for each SDi ∈ SD do //Step-1
5: Frbi ← join chain sets for SDi (Algorithm-2)
6: add Frbi to JCx
7: end for
8: j ← 0
9: for each RSi ∈ RS do //Step-2
10: Reqi ← join chain sets for ASi (Algorithm-2)
11: add Reqi to JCy[j]
12: j ← j + 1
13: end for
14: for each possible edge set CutSet, as one edge is selected
from an
15: element of all JCy members do //Step-3
16: found ← true
17: for each JCxk ∈ JCx do
18: if JCxk ∩ CutSet 6= ∅ then
19: found ← false
20: break
21: end if
22: end for
23: if found then
24: break
25: end if
26: end for
27: end
5. EXPERIMENTS
Constructing functional dependency graph of a given schema is
a straightforward task and its time complexity is O(
∣∣F+∣∣) which
is negligable for a proactive process. Additionally, the time com-
plexity of generating join chains for given “Required” or “Forbid-
den” sets mainly depends on the, “all simple paths” [21] algorithm,
which corresponds to the main step of the process. Hence, also
the overall algorithm is related to time complexity of DFS which is
also negligible for a proactive solution. The main time consuming
part of the whole process is the Algorithm-4, since it is an exhaus-
tive algorithm. The algorithm can be implemented in two different
directions:
• Checking each “Forbidden” set according to a brute-force
selection on “Required” set (Implementation Strategy-I as
given in Algorithm-4).
• Checking each “Required” set according to a brute-force se-
lection on “Forbidden” set (Implementation Strategy-II).
Since the problem is NP-complete some new heuristics may also
be added to the algorithm which might reduce only the expected
execution time. The experiments are performed by choosing mean-
ingfull database parameters. It is important to note that, any logical
database can be divided into sub-schemas in terms of join chains, so
the algorithm can be repeated at each sub-schema easily. The tim-
ings are collected using a i7, 16 GB RAM machine and heuristics
are used during implementation for a better result, such as checking
the forbidden against allowed, or vice versa up to their counts.
Table-2 presents the results of the algorithm when each “Re-
quired” set is checked according to a brute-force selection on “For-
bidden” set and respectively Table-3 depicts the results for the im-
plementation strategy-II.
These benchmarks show that the algorithm is scalable for even
large database sizes. The algorithm is exponential for the worst
case for both strategies, but, the better strategies can be desing ac-
cording to the brute-force selection set size. As shown in the ex-
periments, the timings are mainly dependedent on the brute-force
selected set size.
6. RELATED WORK
Database privacy and inference problem has been very popu-
lar and several works in this field influenced us in developing the
new strategy proposed in this paper. Inference problem has been
discussed in many papers [19, 24, 3, 1, 6], but most of them are
about reactive solutions. These kind of approaches include query
rewriting mechanisms [20], data perturbation methods [9, 18], de-
ception strategies[15] and decomposition-based approaches[26, 11,
10]. The basis of main data perturbation methods is Differential
Privacy, whose idea is try to add noise to the query result in or-
der to prevent the identification while producing meaningful result.
Differential Privacy method is a big step in the literature to prevent
inference attacks; however its usage is limited to the statistical anal-
ysis. Another approach, known as deception mechanism, aims to
corrupt the data by inserting anonymous data or structures, however
its applicability is also limited as Differential Privacy. K-anonymity
[25] is a another leading research on this field, but differential pri-
vacy has proven the hardness of satisfying non-identifiability prob-
lem[14] for dynamic data distribution.
Application usage of database basically needs single-row iden-
tification with actual values (as described in the Introduction sec-
tion). For this kind of applications, the methods developed to pre-
vent the identification can be categorized as being reactive or proac-
tive. Reactive methods tend to behave dynamically according to the
policy or data distribution. Query rewriting techniques (as in Tru-
man and Non-Truman Models called by Elisa Bertino et.al.’s paper
[3]) are reactive solutions to the inference problem. Query history
tracking mechanisms and Chinese-Wall method [4] like approaches
are subject to performance issues, because of being reactive.
To determine the purpose [7] of the user during privacy protec-
tion is a major step. During these checks, attribute-based granu-
larity [22] should be used to preserve precise privacy. The idea
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Table 1: Greedy Edge Selection Phase
EDGE EDGE NUMBER SecurityCount JC1 JC2 JC3 JC4 JC5 JC6 JC7 JC8 JC9 JC10 JC11
B → D e12 4 + + + +
J → K e29 3 + + +
A → D e8 2 + +
B → A e9 2 + -
Not Selected e10 2 - -
Not Selected e14 2 - -
Not Selected e23 2 - -
Not Selected e1 2 - -
Not Selected e2 2 - -
ABCD → A e4 2 + -
Table 2: Timings for Implementation Strategy-I
Criteria Exp1 Exp2 Exp3 Exp4 Exp5 Exp6 Exp7 Exp8 Exp9 Exp10
#edges in FDG 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
#edges in Forbidden Join Chains 10 10 10 10 10 10 20 30 40 50
#Forbidden Join Chains 20 40 60 80 100 100 100 100 100 100
#Required Attribute Sets 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
#Join Chains per Required
Attribute Set 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
#edge per Join Chain for
Required Attribute Set 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
#Duration 2 ms 2 ms 3 ms 3 ms 4 ms 3 ms 3 ms 4 ms 4 ms 6 ms
Table 3: Timings for Implementation Strategy-II
Criteria Exp11 Exp12 Exp13 Exp14 Exp15 Exp16 Exp17 Exp18 Exp19 Exp20
#edges in FDG 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
#edges in Forbidden Join Chains 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
#Forbidden Join Chains 100 80 60 40 20 100 100 100 100 100
#Required Attribute Sets 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
#Join Chains per Required
Attribute Set 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
#edge per Join Chain for
Required Attribute Set 10 10 10 10 10 10 20 30 40 50
#Duration 2 ms 2 ms 1 ms 1 ms 1 ms 1 ms 1 ms 1 ms 1 ms 1 ms
proposed in this paper is totally proactive, as normalization pro-
cess, and can also be supported by reactive methods to construct a
complete mechanism. Database security policy should be checked
against visibility [17] requirements and the external layer should
be constructed accordingly. This paper states a complete, opti-
mized and applicable decomposition strategy compared to [26],
[11] and [10]. The aim of this paper is to perform the decomposi-
tion with policy check, minimal loss of dependencies and by taking
care of indirect dependencies (called as probabilistic dependency in
[26]). The related works propose an effective way of decomposi-
tion database in a somehow similar manner; nevertheless this paper
combines maximal availability, intended privacy, policy check and
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indirect dependencies to carry out a definite decomposition for the
external layer.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The approach given in this paper is a proactive cross-control of
the required and the forbidden attribute sets of relational schema,
which is achieved using a secure decomposition technique to pro-
duce an external schema with maximal availability and minimal
loss of the dependencies. As a future work, this optimization pro-
cess can be further improved by considering the query statistics of
the users, and integrating applicable reactive control mechanisms.
Even though the method presented in this paper is proactive, exper-
iments show that the timings are acceptable even for a reactive-like
behavior in future. We have experienced the benefits of this ap-
proach as given in a real-life example.
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